Start-up Costs, Taxes and Innovative

Entrepreneurship by Darnihamedani, P. (Pourya) et al.
TI 2015-013/VII 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Start-up Costs, Taxes and Innovative 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Pourya Darnihamedani1 
Joern Hendrich Block3  
Jolanda Hessels1,2  
Aram Simonyan4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands; 
2 Tinbergen Institute, the Netherlands; 
3 University of Trier, Trier, Germany; 
4 National Academy of Science of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, Republic of Armenia. 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the 
ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of 
finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
1	
 
Start-up costs, taxes and innovative 
entrepreneurship 
 
Pourya Darnihamedani a, Joern Hendrich Block a,b, Jolanda Hessels a,d, 
Aram Simonyan c 
 
a Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands  
b School of Business, University of Trier, Trier, Germany 
c National Academy of Science of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, Republic of Armenia 
d Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
 
Abstract: Prior research suggests that start-up costs and taxes negatively influence entry into entrepreneurship. Yet, 
no distinction is made regarding the type of entrepreneurship, particularly innovative versus non-innovative 
entrepreneurship. Start-up costs, being one-off costs, may reduce the entry of entrepreneurs whose ideas are not very 
promising, thus increasing the proportion of innovative entrepreneurs. Taxes, being recurring costs, may reduce the 
“prize” of innovation and the profit from entrepreneurship, discouraging individuals with innovative business ideas 
from becoming entrepreneurs. Analyzing a dataset of 632,116 individuals, including 43,223 entrepreneurs from 53 
countries, we can confirm our main predictions. Our paper contributes to the discussion on how governmental 
regulation costs and taxes influence innovative entrepreneurship and technological development. 
Keywords: Innovative entrepreneurship, corporate taxes, personal income taxes, start-up costs, 
entrepreneurial profit 
JEL-classification: H24, H25, L26, L51, O31 
Correspondence: Pourya Darnihamedani, darnihamedani@ese.eur.nl 
Version: Start-up costs taxes and innovative entrepreneurship v33 
2	
 
Introduction 
Firms’ (and individuals’) allocation decisions are responsive to changes in the expected rewards 
of their efforts (Feldstein, 2002; Blume-Kohout and Sood, 2013). The costs imposed by 
government regulations influence the relative rewards of different business activities (Atkinson 
and Stiglitz, 1980; Pizer, 2002). Hence, such costs could also affect what types of entrepreneurs 
enter the market, e.g., whether entrepreneurs are innovative or not. 
Entrepreneurs have to deal with one-off start-up costs, such as notary charges, when setting up 
their businesses, as well as recurring costs in the form of income and corporate taxes. A number 
of prior studies have linked start-up costs and taxes to the level of entrepreneurial activity within 
and across economies (Djankov et al., 2002; Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2002; Gentry and 
Hubbard, 2000; Braunerhjelm and Eklund, 2014). For example, for a sample of European firms, 
Klapper et al. (2006) show that high start-up costs hamper the creation of new firms, particularly 
in sectors that should naturally have high entry rates. Regarding the role of taxes, Cullen and 
Gordon (2007) find that high tax rates have a negative effect on entrepreneurial entry; their 
explanation is that high taxes reduce an individual’s willingness to take entrepreneurial risks. 
In any given country, start-up costs and taxes may not only influence entrepreneurial entry but also 
the likelihood of innovative entrepreneurship because these costs can change the relative rewards 
of innovation (Schumpeter, 1934; Baumol, 1990; 2010). Innovative entrepreneurs play an 
important role in the economy by enhancing competition and providing consumers with new, high 
quality products or services (Schumpeter, 1934; Da Rin et al., 2006; Baumol, 2010). Thus, from a 
policy perspective, it is important to understand how governments, through setting the “rules of 
the game,” may stimulate innovative or non-innovative entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990). Little is 
known about how start-up costs and taxes influence the type of entrepreneurship. We suggest that 
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innovative entrepreneurship is affected by both start-up costs and taxes. On the one hand, low start-
up costs may lead to the entry of high quality entrepreneurs because lower costs are associated 
with more dynamic markets and lower levels of corruption (Djankov et al., 2002, De Soto, 1989). 
On the other hand, low start-up costs (low entry costs) encourage the entry of lower quality 
entrepreneurs, and hence the pool of entrepreneurs is of higher quality when start-up costs are 
higher (De Meza and Webb, 1987; Kaplan et al., 2011). This argument is in line with recent studies, 
such as Monteiro and Assuncao (2012), Branstetter et al. (2013), and Rostam-Afschar (2013), 
which find that low start-up regulations lead to the entry of low-ability entrepreneurs who are 
mainly active in low-tech industries (e.g., retailing business). In the same vein, we argue that, as 
one-off costs, start-up costs impose a selection effect and increase the share and likelihood of 
innovative entrepreneurship in a country. The argument is that, although high start-up costs 
generally discourage entrepreneurial entry (Klapper et al., 2006), such costs might have a less 
pronounced negative effect on the entry of innovative entrepreneurs. This is because innovative 
entrepreneurs expect a high return on their new ventures (Schumpeter, 1934) and therefore may 
be more willing, compared to non-innovative entrepreneurs, to pay high one-off costs to obtain the 
legal status to start a firm (Branstetter et al., 2013). 
We further argue that taxes, which represent recurring costs that reduce the gains from innovation 
and entrepreneurial profit, have a deterrent effect and discourage, in particular, risk-taking 
entrepreneurs with innovative ideas. Innovative entrepreneurs are motivated by the expectation of 
high returns on their innovative activities in the form of “entrepreneurial profit” (Schumpeter, 
1934; Hobsbawm, 1969, p. 40; Baumol et al., 2007). Taxes reduce the expected return on 
innovation and, thus, we argue that they discourage innovative entrepreneurship. High taxes 
partially remove the “prize” of introducing a new product to the market, while entrepreneurs 
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remain responsible and liable when their ideas fail (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000). In addition, high 
tax rates can reduce entrepreneurs’ investment in innovation (Schumpeter, 1934; Henrekson, 2007) 
due to lower retained earnings (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2011). For example, for a sample of 
Swedish individuals, Hansson (2012) found that the severity of the tax system has an adverse 
influence on the entry of highly educated entrepreneurs. 
To investigate how start-up costs and taxes relate to innovative entrepreneurship, we use the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset comprising 632,116 individuals, including 43,223 
entrepreneurs from 53 countries for the years 2004 to 2011. Our regressions show that the level of 
start-up costs has a significant positive relationship with innovative entrepreneurship, whereas the 
level of corporate and personal income tax rates shows a negative relationship. In this way, our 
study reveals how the type of costs (i.e., one-off entry costs versus recurring taxes) imposed by 
government regulations can influence the extent of innovative entrepreneurship in a country. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First, we use prior literature to discuss how start-up 
costs and taxes relate to innovative entrepreneurship. Next, we describe our data sources, variables 
and methods. Subsequently, we present our main results, together with a number of robustness 
checks. In the final section, we present the main conclusions, implications and limitations of the 
study. 
1. Start-up costs and innovative entrepreneurship 
Start-up regulations are procedures and requirements imposed by governments for starting a 
business. Start-up regulations are established to ensure that new companies meet minimum 
requirements to provide goods or services to the market (SRI International, 1999). Several prior 
studies suggest that minimal start-up regulations encourage entrepreneurship (Baumol et al., 2007; 
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Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006). Djankov et al. (2002) further show that countries in 
which start-up regulations are most burdensome have high levels of corruption but not better 
quality public or private goods compared to other countries. However, their suggestion that 
lowering start-up costs leads to the entry of higher quality entrepreneurs has been challenged by 
several recent studies (Rostam-Afschar, 2013; Kaplan et al., 2011; Branstetter et al., 2013). For 
example, for a sample of German individuals, Rostam-Afschar (2013) finds that reducing entry 
regulations leads to a higher number of untrained workers becoming entrepreneurs. This is mainly 
because high entry barriers primarily deter such untrained workers from becoming entrepreneurs. 
Trained workers, with a higher level of human capital, have sufficient means to become 
entrepreneurs, even if the entry barriers are considerably high (Becker, 1993; Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003). 
We similarly argue that when start-up costs are high, individuals with ideas that are less promising 
or novel are less inclined than individuals with more promising or novel ideas to become 
entrepreneurs. This is due to three reasons. First, individuals with promising novel business ideas 
may be willing to bear high start-up costs because they expect high returns from their ventures and 
one-off entry costs are not directly linked to the rewards of innovation (Schumpeter, 1934); on the 
other hand, individuals with less promising and less novel ideas do not expect such high returns, 
and, therefore, they are not willing to incur such costs. Second, individuals with innovative ideas 
have good opportunities to attract external financing (e.g., venture capital or business angels’ 
funds) (Desai et al., 2003). Because innovative entrepreneurs usually have better access to capital, 
they may be more able to incur high start-up costs compared to non-innovative entrepreneurs. 
Third, able entrepreneurs can signal their higher ability to banks by paying high start-up costs. 
Hence, innovative ideas may have higher chances to be funded (De Meza and Webb, 1987; 1999). 
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Otherwise, banks do not know the quality of entrepreneurs’ projects due to asymmetric 
information and the high number of entrepreneurs and may assume because entry is inexpensive, 
that there are many low-ability entrepreneurs. Our arguments are in line with those of Branstetter 
et al. (2013), who find for a sample of Portuguese firms that marginal entrepreneurs tend to enter 
as a consequence of low entry costs. Such entrepreneurs have lower abilities compared to infra-
marginal entrepreneurs. Branstetter et al. also find that marginal entrepreneurs usually establish 
their businesses in low-tech industries (e.g., agriculture, retail sector) where innovation is less 
likely, rather than in high- or medium-tech industries. 
To summarize, we argue that high one-off start-up costs increase the share and likelihood of 
innovative entrepreneurship in a country. 
2. Taxes and innovative entrepreneurship 
Through taxes, governments are able to provide public goods (i.e., goods with benefits that cannot 
be entirely appropriated by market players and yet are needed by society), such as a police force, 
a legal system, an education system and public infrastructure (La Porta et al., 1999). In addition, 
taxes can be used to re-distribute income in a society to support low-income citizens (e.g., the 
unemployed) (Feldstein and Wrobel, 1998; Kaplow and Shavell, 1994).  Governments face an 
important dilemma when making decisions about tax rates. On the one hand, they need to collect 
sufficient taxes to provide high-quality public goods and services for their citizens. On the other 
hand, they want to avoid the danger of deterring economic growth by onerous taxation (Lee and 
Gordon, 2005). 
The tax system affects entrepreneurial decisions and can sometimes punish successful ventures 
more than unsuccessful ones (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000). We argue that taxes, being recurring 
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costs, can have a deterrent effect with regard to innovative entrepreneurship. There are a number 
of reasons why this deterrent effect may occur. First, high taxes reduce the “prize” of innovation 
because taxes usually increase with entrepreneurial profit, sometimes even in a progressive 
manner. In fact, high taxes re-distribute wealth from successful innovative entrepreneurs to other 
citizens in society with low or no income (e.g., the unemployed) (Baumol et al., 2007; Gentry and 
Hubbard, 2000; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993). The entry of innovative entrepreneurs, as explained, 
largely depends on their expected returns on innovation. Because taxes will repeatedly take away 
part of the rewards from innovation, high levels of taxes are expected to discourage individuals 
with innovative ideas from starting a venture. 
Second, high tax rates can have an adverse impact on entrepreneurs’ ability to invest in innovation. 
Prior research has found that one of the main sources of investment capital for entrepreneurs, 
especially during the early stages of the venture, are retained earnings (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 
2011). This is mainly due to the high agency costs of other sources of investment capital. High 
taxes take away part of the start-up’s income that otherwise could be re-invested in innovation. In 
addition, high taxes may be associated with extensive “safety net programs,” such as generous 
unemployment benefits and universal health insurance (Baumol et al., 2007). A tax-financed 
welfare system may reduce household savings and may limit entrepreneurial investments and 
capital accumulation (Kotlikoff, 1995; Fölster, 2002; Baumol et al., 2007), which are important 
determinants of a country’s innovative entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1934; Baumol, 2010; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). In addition, such “safety net programs” usually point to a culture 
that does not appreciate and reward (hard) working individuals (Baumol et al., 2007). This could 
further lead to a lower tendency among entrepreneurs to innovate because innovation requires 
much effort to arrange a “new combination of means of production” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 74). 
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There are two main taxes on entrepreneurs depending on the type of business. In many countries 
(e.g., the Netherlands and the US), profits are taxed under the corporate tax system when the 
business is incorporated (e.g., limited liability), while taxes are imposed on individual earnings 
only when the business is unincorporated (e.g., sole proprietorship) (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006). 
We contend that both types of taxes have deterrent effects on innovative entrepreneurship due to 
the above-mentioned reasons. 
In sum, we expect a high corporate tax rate, as well as a high personal income tax rate, to reduce 
the share of and likelihood of innovative entrepreneurship in a country. 
3. Data and variables 
4.1. Data sources 
We use both individual and country level data in our study. Our individual level data are from 
entrepreneurs who have participated in the Adult Population Survey (APS) of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The data covers 53 countries for 2004 to 2011. GEM is the 
largest cross-country study of entrepreneurial activity, aspirations and attitudes (Reynolds et al., 
2005). GEM collects data on individuals about different aspects of their entrepreneurial activity, 
such as the innovativeness of their ventures, as well as their personal start-up motivations, 
entrepreneurial ambitions and human capital characteristics, which make the GEM data suitable 
to use in our research. 
At the country level, we use the World Bank Doing Business (WBDB) database and the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) for information on start-up costs and taxes. The WBDB 
database contains several measures of business regulations and their enforcement for 155 countries 
from 2004 to the present. These measures demonstrate the regulatory expenses and procedures of 
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undertaking business and have been used in prior research to analyze regulatory influences on the 
productivity and growth of entrepreneurs (e.g., Levie and Autio, 2011; Dreher and Gassebner, 
2013; Braunerhjelm and Eklund, 2014). We use the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) for 
information about corporate and personal income tax rates, as well as for some control variables 
(e.g., GDP growth, GDP per capita). WCY includes annual data for 18 years for more than fifty 
countries that participate in the executive survey conducted by the IMD World Competitiveness 
Center. Several previous studies have used WCY measures to study the impact of country level 
factors on entrepreneurship (e.g., Hessels et al., 2008; van Stel et al., 2007). 
4.2. Sample 
The total GEM sample for 2004-2011 comprises 689,399 18-64 years old individuals including 
(early-stage and established) entrepreneurs, employees, unemployed individuals, students and 
retirees. Of these, 57,796 persons are early-stage entrepreneurs (8.4%), i.e., individuals who are 
setting up their businesses, as well as entrepreneurs who have started their own business in the last 
42 months. For the purpose of this study, we focus on whether such early-stage entrepreneurs 
(which we will label “entrepreneurs”) are innovative or not (see also the variables description 
below). 
Table 1 shows the number of individuals and entrepreneurs per country and distinguishes between 
innovative and non-innovative entrepreneurs. 
----------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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4.3. Variables 
Our dependent variable is innovative entrepreneur. This variable is measured at the individual 
level, based on a question in the GEM survey asking entrepreneurs whether they provide a new 
product or service to the market. The variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 
product or service offered is perceived by the entrepreneur to be new to customers and takes the 
value 0 otherwise. 
Our main independent variables are start-up costs and taxes, which are measured at the country 
level. Start-up costs reflect the expenses required by law to register a new venture in a country. 
The second category, taxes, refers to the (logarithm of) corporate and personal income tax rates in 
a country. Table 2 provides a more detailed overview and description of our independent variables. 
----------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In addition, we add to the regression model a number of individual and country level control 
variables that are common determinants of innovative entrepreneurship, according to prior 
research (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Koellinger, 2008; Anokhin and Schultze, 2009). At the 
individual level, the following variables are included: formal education (a dummy variable that 
indicates whether entrepreneurs have a university education or not), entrepreneurial networks (a 
dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur knows someone personally who started a new 
business in the last two years or not), perception of entrepreneurial skills (a dummy variable 
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indicating whether the entrepreneur perceives him- or herself to have relevant skills, knowledge 
and experience for setting up a business), recent prior entrepreneurship experience (a dummy 
variable that indicates whether someone quit as an entrepreneur in the past 12 months or not) and 
established business ownership (a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent owns a 
business older than 42 months), gender (a dummy variable that equals one for males), as well as 
age and age squared are included. In addition, “year” and “industry” are added as dummy variables 
to the regression model. The following industries are included in this research: business services 
(financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities); consumer oriented services 
(hotels and restaurants, other services); extractive industries (agriculture, fishing, mining and 
quarrying) and transforming (manufacturing, electricity gas and water, construction, trade and 
repairs, transports, storage and communication). At the country level, we include GDP growth and 
the (logarithm of) GDP per capita, which are both taken from the WCY database. After removing 
missing observations for all our variables, we retain a sample of 632,116 individuals of whom 
43,223 are entrepreneurs. 
4.4. Method 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable innovative entrepreneur, we use various probit 
regressions. We cluster the individual-level data by countries to avoid underestimation of standard 
errors and overconfident inferences (Huber and Stanig, 2011). Furthermore, we employ a 
Heckman probit model because there might be a selection bias when we assess the influence of 
start-up costs and taxes on the likelihood for entrepreneurs to be innovative. This is mainly because 
start-up costs and taxes could affect the entry of individuals into entrepreneurship (Djankov et al., 
2002; Cullen and Gordon, 2007, Gentry and Hubbard, 2000), in addition to their effect on 
innovative entrepreneurship. Hence trying to estimate the influence of start-up costs and taxes on 
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an entrepreneur’s likelihood to innovate may lead to biased estimators when such potential 
selection bias is not taken into account. Heckman correction (probit) models are used to address 
this methodological issue. Additionally, we have tested for the presence of a selection bias through 
likelihood ratio tests: The likelihood ratio test of rho (which compares the log likelihoods of the 
selection plus outcome models with the log likelihood of the probit model with sample selection) 
displays that a Heckman model is indeed required (Table 4). 
The Heckman model has one selection and one outcome equation. The selection equation (the first 
stage) estimates entry into entrepreneurship, including all the above-mentioned individual and 
country level predictors. In addition, we add the employment status of individuals (dummy 
variables indicating whether someone is employed, unemployed, a student or a retiree) to the 
selection equation. The outcome equation (i.e., the second stage) estimates whether an 
entrepreneur innovates or not. 
The Heckman probit model is similar to other Heckman correction models (Heckman, 1976; 1979; 
Puhani, 2000) regarding how it corrects for selection bias, except that the outcome dependent 
variable is a dummy variable and not a metric variable. Hence, we have: 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܧ ൌ 1|ܼሻ ൌ 	߮ሺܼߛሻ   (1) 
and  
ܧ ൌ ܼߛ ൅	ݑଵ     (2) 
where E designates entry into entrepreneurship (E=1 if the person is an entrepreneur and 0 
otherwise), Z is the vector of predicting variables (e.g., start-up costs, corporate and income tax 
rates (log), GDP per capita (log), education level of the individual, entrepreneurial networks), ߛ is 
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a vector of unknown parameters, ߮ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution and ݑଵ is the error term. The first stage of the Heckman model yields results that can 
be used to predict the likelihood of being an entrepreneur for each individual. 
The second stage (the outcome model) has the following form: 
ܫ∗ ൌ ߮ሺܺߚ ൅	ݑଶሻ    (3) 
where ܫ∗ represents entrepreneur’s likelihood to innovate, ܺ is the vector of predicting variables 
(e.g., start-up costs, tax rates, education level), ߚ is a vector of unknown parameters and ݑଶ is the 
error term. 
The model assumes that error terms ݑଵ and ݑଶ, have normal distributions and are homoscedastic. 
The error terms are correlated with ܿ݋ݎݎሺݑଵ, ݑଶሻ ൌ ߩ. When standard probit techniques are applied 
to equation (3), it yields biased results, while the Heckman probit model provides consistent, 
asymptotically efficient estimates for all parameters in such models (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 
1981). 
Moreover, as with simple probit models, we cluster standard errors by countries. In the next 
section, we present the regression results. The main control variables correspond to Braunerhjelm 
and Eklund (2014) and are added stepwise to avoid multicollinearity concerns. 
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4. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Before we describe our main results, we present descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
variables used in our study (Table 3). A total of 18.4% of the entrepreneurs are innovative and 
introduce new products or services to the market. Forty nine percent (49.0%) of the entrepreneurs 
have a university education, 3.4% have recent prior entrepreneurship experience and 37.0% have 
another entrepreneur in their networks. Regarding country-level indicators, on average, it takes 
8.6% of a person’s average income (measured as GDP per capita) to register a company. In 
addition, corporate and personal income tax rates are, on average, 27.0% and 31.5%, respectively. 
The correlation matrix shows that the correlations between individual-level variables are low. 
Regarding macro-level variables, we find high correlations between log GDP per capita and start-
up costs (correlation is -0.65), as well as between corporate and personal income tax rates 
(correlation is 0.48). In light of these high correlations, we adopt a stepwise approach in our 
regression analysis. 
----------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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4.2. Main findings 
Table 4 presents the Heckman probit regression results. Concerning start-up costs imposed by the 
government, we find a significant positive relationship between the required start-up costs and 
entrepreneurs’ likelihood to innovate (Model I in Table 4). Hence, ceteris paribus, early-stage 
entrepreneurs are more likely to innovate when start-up costs are high in a country. We find a 
marginal effect of 0.1%-point. That is, evaluated at the sample means, a 10%-points increase in 
start-up costs from the mean leads to an increase in the predicted probability of innovative 
entrepreneurship of 1%-point — an increase of 9.8% in the likelihood for entrepreneurs in a 
country to be innovative. 
Concerning the role of corporate and personal income tax rates, our results (Model II and Model 
III in Table 4) show an overall significant negative relationship between both types of taxes and 
entrepreneurs’ likelihood to innovate. We find a marginal effect of -1%-point for the variable 
corporate tax rate (log). That is, evaluated at the sample mean, a 10%-point decrease in a country’s 
corporate tax rates from the mean leads to an increase in the predicted probability of innovative 
entrepreneurship of 0.6%-points — an increase of approximately 6% in the probability that 
entrepreneurs innovate. Moreover, we find a significant marginal effect of -1.7%-points for the 
variable personal income tax rate (log). 
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Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
4.3. Additional findings 
Next to the main predictors, the impact of the control variables on an entrepreneurs’ likelihood to 
innovate is also reported in Table 4. At the country level, GDP growth and log GDP per capita 
have insignificant associations with entrepreneurs’ likelihood to innovate. At the individual level, 
a high level of formal education, knowing another entrepreneur, prior entrepreneurship experience 
and (perceived) entrepreneurial skills have significant positive associations with entrepreneurs’ 
propensity to innovate. Among these variables, perception of entrepreneurial skills seems to have 
the strongest relationship with innovation (a marginal effect of 5.4%-points). 
Regarding the selection model and at the country level, only log GDP per capita consistently shows 
a significant negative relationship with entry into entrepreneurship. Hence, countries with a higher 
GDP per capita have a lower likelihood of entrepreneurial entry. At the individual level, prior 
entrepreneurship experience, perception of entrepreneurial skills, having entrepreneurial networks 
and being male show a significant positive relationship with individuals’ likelihood to become an 
entrepreneur. Being an established business owner and age, however, negatively relate to entry 
into entrepreneurship. 
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4.4.Robustness checks 
Hierarchical regression  
The likelihood ratio test results provided in Table 4 show that a Heckman model is necessary due 
to the existence of a selection bias. Yet, we also find that when we use simple probit regressions, 
taking only the sample of entrepreneurs without accounting for selection bias, results are similar 
to the Heckman regressions. However, these models with clustered standard errors are not 
specifically designed to analyze hierarchical data (Franzese, 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 
2012). As entrepreneurs are nested in countries, a multi-level regression designed to combine 
variables from different aggregation levels takes into account possible intra-class correlations, thus 
reducing the likelihood of type 1 and type 2 errors (Hofmann et al., 2000). Multi-level models 
estimate the variances of the random effects and use this information to give observations different 
weights. Thus, multi-level models not only correct the standard errors but also provide better 
estimations of coefficients. Hence, we also analyze our data employing multi-level logit 
regressions with random intercepts as a robustness check. 
Unlike multi-level models, clustering standard errors does not need to have asymptotics in terms 
of the number of observations per cluster, (Huber and Stanig, 2011). In addition, it has been argued 
that clustering standard errors provides model-free standard errors, while multi-level models 
require a correct model for the structure of variance e.g., standard deviations are constant at each 
level (Gelman and Hill, 2007). Moreover, multi-level models assume that errors and regressors are 
uncorrelated at all levels requiring the model to contain all relevant variables. Thus, multi-level 
modeling imposes more assumptions on the model than using cluster-adjusted standard errors 
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(Primo et al., 2007; Gelman and Hill, 2007), which is one of the main reasons why we use the 
multilevel regressions merely as a robustness check. 
The multilevel logit regressions show similar results as the Heckman probit regressions (Table 5, 
columns I, II and III). Using these models, we also find that start-up costs have a significant 
positive relationship with the probability for entrepreneurs to be innovative and that corporate and 
income tax rates have a significant negative association with the likelihood of innovative 
entrepreneurship. 
Instrumental variable approach 
One limitation of a cross-sectional study of the relation between taxes and entrepreneurship is the 
possibility of confounding factors (e.g., social security, good quality infrastructure). We try to deal 
with this possible endogeneity issue by using air transport - measured by (log of) passengers 
carried including both domestic and international aircraft passengers registered in the country - as 
instrument for taxes. Air transport depends on several factors such as the location of a country (and 
airport), transportation infrastructure and the population of a country. Hence, using it as an 
instrument can help to address the possible endogeneity issue in the relationship of taxes with 
innovative entrepreneurship. 
We argue that air transport is associated with tax rates because countries with a large population, 
a good location and a decent transportation infrastructure have more passengers and these countries 
need to have higher tax rates to finance decent public goods (e.g., transportation infrastructure) for 
citizens.  The correlation between the instrument and (corporate and income) tax rates is high since 
F-statistics, when we regress air transport on tax rates, are above 10 indicating that the instrument 
is not weak. In addition, and in order to check the validity of the instrument, we use Hansen’s J 
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test which shows that the instrument is valid as it is uncorrelated with the error term of our 
regression model with innovative entrepreneur as the dependent variable.1  
We use instrumental variable probit regression analysis clustering the data by countries. Results 
of the instrumental variable approach are provided in Table 5, columns IV and V. The results 
confirm our previous finding that tax rates have a significant negative relationship with the 
likelihood of innovative entrepreneurship in a country.    
----------------------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
5. Discussion 
Our results support the conclusion that start-up costs and taxes have significant and profound 
effects on whether nascent entrepreneurs innovate or not. Several prior studies have found that 
heavy start-up regulations reduce entrepreneurial entry at least in the form of “formal 
entrepreneurship” (De Soto, 1989; Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006). Based on these 
studies, a negative relationship between start-up costs and innovative entrepreneurship can be 
expected due to two main arguments: First, and in line with public choice theory (Stigler, 1971), 
it could be claimed that entry costs keep out competitors and increase incumbent benefits. While 
this may be socially inefficient (Djankov et al., 2002), we argue the contrary — that such costs can 
actually increase the likelihood of entrepreneurs to be innovative because their expected returns 
                                                            
1 Results of the validity and strength tests of the instrument are available from the corresponding author upon 
request. 
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on innovation are less likely to be competed away (Schumpeter, 1934; Gilbert, 2006). Low start-
up costs, which make entry relatively easy, can stimulate an excessive entry of non-innovative 
entrepreneurs (Porter, 1980; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Branstetter et al., 2013). When 
facing high start-up costs, entrepreneurs may be willing to enter only if their ideas are promising 
and the expected returns on their ideas are high. 
A second argument for expecting a negative relationship with innovation is that high entry 
regulations associate with corruption and bribery, which can subsequently upset innovative 
entrepreneurial efforts (Djankov et al., 2002; De Soto, 1989; Baumol et al., 2007). This association, 
however, has recently been challenged after the influential studies of De Soto (1989; 2000) and 
Djankov et al. (2002), as many countries (including those with higher levels of corruption) have 
significantly lowered the barriers to new business creation (van Stel et al., 2007; Monteiro and 
Assuncao, 2012). For instance, Russia has lowered its start-up costs from 13% in 2002 to 5% in 
2006 and to 2% in 2012. Given that our database is mostly composed of upper middle- and high-
income countries in the years from 2004 to 2011 (Table 1), the above-mentioned link between 
entry regulations and corruption seems loose and unsupported. Furthermore, recent empirical 
studies on start-up regulations and entrepreneurship (e.g., Monteiro and Assuncao, 2012; 
Branstetter et al., 2013) have cast doubts upon the negative associations, suggested by Djankov et 
al. (2002), between the time and costs required for starting a business and the quality of 
entrepreneurs in emerging and advanced economies. According to these studies, marginal 
entrepreneurs decide to register their firms when start-up costs are low (De Meza and Webb, 1999). 
These marginal entrepreneurs are less able entrepreneurs and less likely to have a promising 
innovative idea compared to infra-marginal entrepreneurs (Tokman, 1992). 
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In this study, we find that in more tax-friendly countries, entrepreneurs show a higher propensity 
to engage in innovation. As we explained earlier, higher rates of corporate and personal income 
taxes can adversely affect the prize of innovation for entrepreneurs. This argument fits a more 
general notion in the innovation literature that firms’ propensity to engage in innovation is 
responsive to changes in the expected profitability of their potential products (Gilbert, 2006; 
Blume-Kohout and Sood, 2013). While onerous taxation can lower the amount of the innovation 
prize, entrepreneurs tend to credit themselves for their successes (Cullen and Gordon, 2005; 
Parker, 2009). Hence, entrepreneurs with a tendency to innovate are likely to severely resent 
governments’ efforts to take away part of their earnings (Baumol et al., 2007). In line with our 
findings, some other studies suggest that a high rate of tax payments on entrepreneurs (e.g., through 
a progressive tax system) can decrease their willingness to take risks (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000; 
Cullen and Gordon, 2007). 
Moreover, a high tax rate can lower the possibilities for investments in innovation due to lower 
levels of retained earnings and lower levels of savings (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2011). In 
addition, high tax rates reduce the expected (risk-adjusted, after tax) returns on innovative ventures 
and subsequently decrease venture capital investments in innovative start-ups (Da Rin et al., 2006). 
Heavy taxation can also have an adverse influence on the inflow of foreign direct investment 
(Djankov et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2004). Foreign investors normally bring their knowledge, 
experience and technologies along with their money to the countries they invest in (De Clercq et 
al., 2008; Baumol et al., 2007). In addition, foreign direct investment may provide the required 
funding for innovative entrepreneurs, e.g., by buying part of the new venture (Wright et al., 2005). 
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6. Implications  
To date, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the influence of the costs imposed by 
regulations on innovative entrepreneurship. This suggests that regulations are not considered a 
source of costs that can take away the “prize” of entrepreneurial innovation. Although studies 
investigated the influence of institutions and regulations on the level and the type of entrepreneurs 
(Cullen and Gordon, 2007; Branstetter et al., 2013), it was not clear, particularly at the micro-level, 
how these regulations influence the relative rewards for innovation. Our goal in this article has 
been to investigate the effect of some of the most important, yet debated, costs imposed by 
regulations on entrepreneurs’ propensity to innovate. Our focus on starting entrepreneurs is 
relevant because the type and quality of new actors that enter the market is likely to have 
implications for a country’s overall entrepreneurial or business quality. Our argument is premised 
on the notion that entrepreneurs innovate mainly to gain above-average profit margins in line with 
Schumpeter’s proposition (1934). In this context, the government can stimulate entrepreneurial 
innovation by using appropriate business regulations to structure the relative rewards for 
innovation (Baumol, 1990). 
Several policy implications can be derived from our findings. First, the extent to which start-up 
regulation costs are linked to the expected profit of innovation can influence entrepreneurs’ 
propensity to innovate. As mentioned, innovative entrepreneurs can contribute to economic 
development through offering new products to the market and through challenging established 
large corporations in the marketplace (Schumpeter, 1934; Klepper, 1996). The government can 
stimulate innovative entrepreneurship by tying costs less directly to the rewards of innovation. For 
example, and in line with the suggestion of Baumol et al. (2007), taxes on properties and goods 
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are preferred to taxes on income and profit if the goal is to promote innovative business activities 
and growth. 
Second, and regarding start-up costs, our results suggest that in spite of a possible negative 
relationship with the supply of entrepreneurial ventures (Klapper et al., 2006), such costs actually 
have a significant positive relation with the likelihood of entrepreneurs to be innovative. Hence, 
this finding suggests that policy-makers should think more carefully about the consequences of 
having lower start-up costs. Lowering these costs, on the one hand, can increase the rate of 
entrepreneurship, leading to less unemployment and a more dynamic business environment 
(Branstetter et al., 2013; Klapper et al., 2006). On the other hand, lowering start-up costs may 
decrease the likelihood that entrepreneurs will innovate, possibly due to the (excessive) entry of 
imitative entrepreneurs and lower expected returns on innovation. 
Third, if innovative entrepreneurship is indeed an important source of economic growth 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Da Rin et al., 2006), then our finding that entrepreneurs have a low propensity 
to innovate in countries with severe tax systems could partly explain why taxes may have a 
negative influence on economic growth as suggested in prior studies (Lee and Gordon, 2005). 
While previous studies have pointed to other detrimental effects of high corporate and income tax 
rates for the economy (Grossman, 1993), policy-makers should also be aware of the adverse 
consequences of high tax rates for firms’ and entrepreneurs’ propensity to innovate. 
7. Limitations and further research 
This study has a number of limitations that should be taken into account. First, using cross-
sectional data makes it difficult to establish causal relationships. Although the instrumental 
variable approach helps to reduce the threat of omitted variable bias, a panel dataset of 
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entrepreneurs and a major change in tax rates or start-up costs across time constitute the ideal 
setting to investigate how these macro-level predictors influence entrepreneurs’ decisions to 
engage in innovation. A second limitation concerns our use of a self-reported measure of 
innovation. Using an objective measure of innovation (e.g., new product sales as a percentage of 
total sales) would be preferred, although access to such data in a cross-country setting comprising 
enough observations for each country would be very difficult, if not impossible. 
We would like to highlight two main avenues for future studies. First, it would be interesting to 
investigate the impact of other regulations, such as labor regulations on entrepreneurs’ propensity 
to innovate. High costs imposed by labor regulations, for example, may increase the costs of 
innovation because innovation is often accompanied with labor adjustments (Scarpetta and 
Tressel, 2004; Da Rin et al., 2006), while such costs may discourage the entry of entrepreneurs 
with not so promising ideas. Second, we only look at one type of innovation (product innovation) 
in this study. Further research could investigate the relationship between taxes and other types of 
innovation. While our findings suggest that taxes reduce the likelihood of product innovation 
among entrepreneurs, taxes possibly have a similar, different or no effect on other types of 
innovation. High tax rates, for example, may stimulate entrepreneurs to buy new machinery and 
declare it as a cost to avoid paying large amounts of taxes, and hence, this could increase the 
likelihood of process innovation. 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Sample of individuals and entrepreneurs by country 
Country Total sample of individuals 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in total sample of 
individuals 
Share of innovative 
entrepreneurs in total 
sample of 
entrepreneurs 
Argentina 7,732 13.63% 22.79% 
Australia 7,330 9.65% 11.74% 
Austria 2,253 7.68% 10.40% 
Belgium 12,203 4.77% 14.67% 
Brazil 12,041 15.42% 4.94% 
Canada 1,202 9.82% 14.41% 
Chile 16,817 15.49% 41.78% 
China 10,385 19.37% 13.82% 
Colombia 18,489 18.21% 23.21% 
Croatia 7,213 9.47% 10.40% 
Czech republic 1,829 6.56% 10.00% 
Denmark 19,317 5.39% 24.24% 
Finland 8,820 8.56% 12.45% 
France 10,877 3.33% 9.18% 
Germany 23,199 7.61% 10.72% 
Greece 9,947 8.87% 15.93% 
Hong Kong 2,661 8.72% 8.19% 
Hungary 11,364 7.60% 5.27% 
Iceland 8,997 14.93% 15.79% 
India 3,562 13.62% 17.01% 
Indonesia 1,432 22.97% 26.14% 
Ireland 7,951 9.96% 14.77% 
Israel 6,854 7.57% 20.27% 
Italy 10,744 4.45% 16.74% 
Japan 7,939 5.08% 11.41% 
Jordan 3,053 17.95% 33.94% 
Kazakhstan 1,315 13.31% 2.86% 
Korea 3,751 12.02% 10.20% 
Latvia 8,875 8.77% 11.70% 
Malaysia 4,349 8.09% 8.16% 
Mexico 8,811 8.52% 13.21% 
Netherlands 16,158 6.14% 19.22% 
New Zealand 1,920 19.38% 13.10% 
Norway 9,652 8.20% 11.30% 
Peru 8,958 34.29% 28.75% 
Philippines 1,715 24.43% 7.88% 
Poland 2,053 8.43% 11.48% 
Portugal 3,175 8.98% 11.23% 
Romania 6,708 3.44% 8.65% 
Russia 7,135 2.55% 16.71% 
Singapore 7,327 8.75% 15.76% 
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Slovenia 12,830 6.72% 16.59% 
South Africa 8,981 8.90% 23.28% 
Spain 163,679 5.96% 17.40% 
Sweden 34,579 3.10% 10.15% 
Switzerland 9,292 6.60% 14.93% 
Taiwan 1,766 8.83% 45.51% 
Thailand 5,881 16.44% 14.24% 
Turkey 6,111 8.18% 39.08% 
UK 95,337 6.98% 11.60% 
United Arab Emirates 4,612 10.36% 13.56% 
United States 17,648 9.38% 36.40% 
Venezuela 2,570 21.09% 9.41% 
Total 689,399   
 
 
Table 2–Description and data sources of the main country level variables 
 Variable Description Source 
Start-up costs The average costs of obtaining legal status to operate a firm which 
is measured as a percentage of per capita income. It contains all 
recognizable official expenses such as fees, costs of forms and 
procedures, photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges. 
WBDB 
Corporate tax rate on 
profit 
Maximum corporate tax rate, calculated on profit before tax  WCY 
Personal income tax 
rate 
Maximum personal income tax rate in percent of the individual’s 
income 
WCY 
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Table 3- Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the individual and country level variables 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Individual level variables                
1. Product innovation 0.18 0.39              
2. High level of education 0.49 0.50 0.05             
3. Entrepreneurial networks 0.37 0.48 0.01 -0.01            
4. Perceived entrepreneurial skills 0.49 0.50 0.01 -0.06 0.18           
5. Prior entrepreneurship experience 0.03 0.18 0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.06          
6. Established business ownership 0.08 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03         
7. Age 43.23 26.63 0.00 0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.02        
8. Male 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.04 -0.02       
Country level variables                
9. Start-up costs 8.60 11.00 0.08 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.02      
10. Corporate tax rate (log) 3.29 0.68 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.04     
11. Personal income tax rate (log) 3.44 0.57 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.47 0.48    
12. Air transport (log) 17.13 1.45 -0.07 0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.29 0.20 0.38   
13. GDP per capita (log) 10.05 3.58 -0.07 0.14 -0.04 0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.08 0.06 -0.65 -0.07 0.49 0.29  
14. GDP growth 2.64 0.83 0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.32 0.11 -0.26 -0.12 -0.50 
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Table 4 – Results of the Heckman probit regression analysis of start-up costs and taxes on entrepreneurs’ propensity to innovate  
 
 Product innovation 
(model I) 
Selection 
model 
Product innovation 
(model II) 
Selection 
model 
Product innovation 
Model (III) 
Selection 
model 
Predicted probabilities  0.11  0.10  0.10  
 
Marginal 
effect 
t-statistics t-statistics 
Marginal 
effect  
t-statistics t-statistics 
Marginal 
effect 
t-statistics t-statistics 
Country level variables          
Start-up costs 0.001 2.26** -0.60       
Corporate tax rate (log)    -0.010 -5.37*** -0.73    
Income tax rate (log)       -0.017 -2.01** -1.23 
GDP per capita (log) -0.002 -0.20 -4.80*** -0.014 -1.53 -4.11*** -0.007 -0.82 -3.95*** 
GDP growth rate 0.003 1.66* 0.86 0.002 1.17 0.92 0.002 1.47 0.85 
Individual level control variables          
High level of education 0.019 4.42*** 0.48 0.017 3.99*** 0.43 0.018 4.22*** 0.33 
Entrepreneurial networks 0.013 1.85* 13.50*** 0.014 2.09** 13.32*** 0.013 1.94* 13.30*** 
Perceived entrepreneurial skills 0.052 3.10*** 23.01*** 0.054 3.46*** 22.67*** 0.054 3.36*** 22.43*** 
Gender (male=1) 0.004 0.47 4.36*** 0.004 0.49 4.14*** 0.005 0.50 4.01*** 
Age -0.001 -0.65 2.35** -0.001 -0.49 2.34** -0.001 -0.53 2.39** 
Age-square  0.00001 0.47 -3.52*** 0.000003 0.31 -3.48*** 0.000006 0.33 -3.56*** 
Established business ownership 0.022 1.21 -6.80*** 0.021 1.19 -6.79*** 0.023 1.23 -6.79*** 
Prior entrepreneurship experience 0.022 2.96*** 11.63*** 0.021 2.96*** 11.72*** 0.021 2.89*** 11.98*** 
Industry dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Employment status dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant  -3.56*** -0.24  -1.99** -0.57  -2.51** -0.59 
Sample size  632,116 43,223  632,116 43,223  632,116 43,223 
Number of countries  53  53  53 
Likelihood Ratio test (rho=0)(prob>chi2)  ***  ***  *** 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
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Table 5 – robustness check results, multi-level and IV  
 
Estimation method 
(I) 
Multi-level
(II) 
Multi-level
(III) 
Multi-level
(IV) 
IV 
(V) 
IV 
Country level variables      
Start-up costs 0.015*** (0.003)     
Corporate tax rate (log)  -0.099*** (0.017)  
-0.759** 
(0.340)  
Income tax rate (log)   -0.181** (0.085)  
-0.481** 
(0.243) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.178** (0.070) 
-0.098 
(0.068) 
-0.027 
(0.072) 
-0.064 
(0.045) 
0.125 
(0.112) 
GDP growth rate 0.032*** (0.008) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
0.027 
(0.18) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
Individual level control variables      
High level of education 0.114*** (0.028) 
0.151*** 
(0.054) 
0.145*** 
(0.052) 
0.043 
(0.047) 
0.054 
(0.038) 
Entrepreneurial networks 0.076*** (0.028) 
0.066* 
(0.035) 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
0.005 
(0.027) 
0.016 
(0.022) 
Perceived entrepreneurial skills 0.195*** (0.040) 
0.274*** 
(0.069) 
0.276*** 
(0.069) 
0.139*** 
(0.051) 
0.156*** 
(0.047) 
Gender (male=1) 0.004 (0.027) 
0.004 
(0.043) 
0.012 
(0.044) 
-0.32 
(0.36) 
0.009 
(0.026) 
Age -0.001 (0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Age-square  0.000 (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Established business ownership 0.268*** (0.051) 
0.329*** 
(0.079) 
0.325*** 
(0.071) 
0.179*** 
(0.056) 
0.184*** 
(0.045) 
Prior entrepreneurship experience 0.068 (0.043) 
0.088* 
(0.051) 
0.089* 
(0.051) 
0.000 
(0.063) 
0.036 
(0.031) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.432*** (0.699) 
-1.176 
(0.802) 
-1.596** 
(0.759) 
1.909 
(1.458) 
-1.021 
(0.632) 
Sample size 45,111 45,111 45,111 45,111 45,111 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
